The issue of abortion is discussed with reference to the claim that people have a right ofcontrol over their own bodies. Do people "own" their own bodies? Ifso, what would be entailed? These questions are discussed in commonsense terms and also in relation to the jurisprudence ofHohfeld, Honore, Munzer and Waldron.
intended reasonableness and truthfulness which one does not bear concerning what other voices say.
Homeowners are morally and legally entitled to paint the outsides of their front doors any colour they choose. None the less, the entitlement does not derive from an entitlement to do anything they like with their own houses, from a freedom from all obligations concerning how their houses are treated and controlled. Concerning his or her own home, a homeowner has particular duties as well as particular rights which other people do not have concerning his or her home. Analogously, we have particular moral duties as well as particular moral rights towards and concerning our own bodies.
According to Shaver:
"The assertion that a woman has the right to control her own body is an unambiguous statement of her proprietorship in her person, and the 'right to choose' an expression of her free will. These claims assume an essential individualism in which the woman properly acts in the pursuit of her own needs and wishes. Her rightful action is limited only by the freedom of others to do likewise".'
Consider this together with another of Shaver's claims that: "The notion of individual rights is quintessentially liberal. At the heart of liberalism lies the proposition that the individual is the rightful possessor ofhis or her bodily capacities, what MacPherson has termed the ideology of possessive individualism".'
Here, Shaver paints only half of the picture of liberalism. It seems strange to talk of "rightful possession" of one's body or of its capacities but, insofar as one might/does, one should say that "rightful possession" of one's body and its capacities is the source of duties no less than of rights concerning it and them. Quintessential to liberalism is the notion of individual moral autonomy from which follows equally the potential for the possession of obligations and of rights concerning one's own body.
To say that we have duties concerning our own bodies would seem precisely to place limits on our rights concerning them. To the question of whether we own our own bodies, Munzer does not give an unqualified "yes" or no Because we cannot sell them, he is reluctant to say that we own our own bodies, that they are our property. Munzer argues that, rather than owning our bodies, we have limited property rights in them. Furthermore, he argues, we also have rights other than property rights in and concerning our bodies.
An "The idea of property rights is narrower than that of property. Property rights involve only advantageous incidents. Property involves disadvantageous incidents as well. Meant here is advantage or disadvantage to the right-holder or owner. Although property obviously involves disadvantages to persons other than the right-holder, it is important to see that there can be disadvantages to the right-holder as well. a suburban area. Then she has a duty not to use it in ways prohibited by the law of nuisance or by zoning regulations. She may be disabled from transferring it to others with burdensome restrictions -for example, that no one may use it save for unduly limited purposes. If someone wins a court judgment for damages against her, then, subject perhaps to homestead laws, she has a liability that the homestead be sold to pay the judgment. The duty, disability, and liability are disadvantageous to her. it would be odd to say that they are part of her property rights in her home. But they are part of what is involved in saying that the home is her property".9
Waldron also emphasises that ownership of property entails liabilities as well as their opposites.'0 However, Waldron is less reluctant than Munzer to deny on the basis of non-transferability that we cannot own our own bodies. He writes: "I can be the owner of something in the sense that it is for me rather than for anyone else to make decisions about its use (and in the sense that society will back up my decisions with force if need be), without it being the case that I can, by my say-so, transfer exactly that power of decision over the resource to somebody else". 1 "
In discussing Locke's theory of property 
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